Evidence--Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege by Woods, Nancy L.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 
1979 
Evidence--Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege 
Nancy L. Woods 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nancy L. Woods, Evidence--Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 Tulsa L. J. 390 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss2/11 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
EVIDENCE-SCOPE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979)
cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886);
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of the attorney-client privilege for corporations has
been litigated in numerous courts.1 A split in authority has developed
among federal jurisdictions but appellate courts in both the Sixth and
Third Circuits recently aligned themselves with the courts which ad-
here to the control group test.2 Rejecting attempts by other circuit
I. The attention attracted by the 1963 decision, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), (addressing the basic issue whether or not the privilege could apply
to a corporation at all) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), forced many courts to attempt to define
the scope of the privilege in the corporate area. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 503(b)[04 (1979). One writer has aptly described the situation:
The isssues [sic) raised in attempting to apply the attorney-client privilege to corpo-
rations have vexed litigants and courts. Admittedly, reasonable men may agree in prin-
ciple and still differ on solutions in particular cases. Because the circumstances in which
layman and attorney communicate are so varied, inflexible rules of general application
should not long prove satisfying, even to their proponents. Unfortunately, . . . the his-
tory of the corporate attorney-client privilege in the federal courts has been punctuated
by a series ofjust such pat and unsatisfying formulations. Although these facile dogmas
may permit a certain ease of application, they manage to avoid both of the two questions
that ought to be pivotal to the existence of the attorney-client privilege in every case:
first, does the communication occur for the socially desirable purpose of securing legal
advice or legal services prior to a proposed transaction; and second, could the existence
or non-existence of the privilege significantly affect the likelihood that the communica-
tion would be made?
Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 341 (1972).
2. A majority of courts have adopted a test based on the person communicating (control
group test); while others have focused on the nature of the communication (subject matter test).
Cases following the control group test include: Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968);
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF
Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.
Cal. 1963); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962); City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Cases following a
subject matter test or a modification of such a test include: Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.
1970), a,'dmem by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (Douglas, J., abstaining); In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v.
Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1974), a.'d without opinion, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir.
1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974); Hasso v. Retail
Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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courts to broaden the scope of this privilege, the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Upjohn Co.3 and the Third Circuit in In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation4 opted for a narrower standard. By adopting the most restrictive
position in this controversial area, they have moved the federal courts
one step closer to a uniform rule severely limiting the application of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. This article will re-
view the previously established tests for the use of the privilege and
assess the significance of the holdings in these two most recent federal
court decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
The privilege is generally recognized as an intrinsic and necessary
part of the attorney-client relationship because it encourages clients to
make full disclosures to their attorneys, thereby allowing attorneys to
better aid the clients.' The privilege is invoked by clients to protect
confidential information communicated by them to their attorney.6 A
problem arises, however, when the client is a corporation and the court
must determine which individuals within the corporate structure are
entitled to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.7
Both the United States Supreme Court and Congress previously
3. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979) cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No.
79-886).
4. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. The policy of the privilege has been plainly grounded since the latter part of the
1700's on subjective considerations. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must
be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent.
Such is the modem theory.
8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. For a general statement of the essentials underlying the privilege see id. § 2292:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
7. The application of the privilege to corporate "clients" poses a somewhat different
problem. Since corporations are inanimate, artificial entities, the attorney-client rela-
tionship is conceptually more difficult, and its underlying principles are less obvious. As
clients, corporations can communicate to attorneys only through agents. Moreover, cor-
porations, unlike individuals, are organized in such a way that responsibilities, and the
information needed to fulfill the responsibilities, are delegated and compartmentalized.
Thus, marketing officials have knowledge and duties related only to selling, while plant
supervisors have knowledge and duties related only to production. It is only the senior
management, guiding and integrating the several operations, which can be said to pos-
sess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.
Courts have generally recognized that the attorney-client privilege applies to corpo-
rations so long as the attorney-client relationship was initiated and pursued by the com-
pany's management. Any communication made by top management to the corporation's
2
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failed to resolve this problem. 8 They instead adopted "a case-by-case
approach which will merely postpone the question. . .... - This result-
ing split in authority should eventually force the Supreme Court to ad-
dress and resolve the conffict. The federal courts have been forced to
adopt their own guidelines and have formulated various tests for deter-
mining which corporate employees can be classified as the client and
can, therefore, safely communicate privileged information to corporate
attorneys.'I The District Court for Massachusetts outlined general cri-
teria for using the attorney-client privilege in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp. " The court suggested that corporate use of the
privilege could be extended to a broad group of "officers and employ-
ees,""2 but confusion subsequently developed over the dimensions of
the term "employees."' 3  Further, the related limits imposed by the
United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor 4 have diminished
attorney, which otherwise meets the requirements of the attorney-client privilege, is pro-
tected from disclosure.
The difficulty arises when, after the attorney-client relationship has been established
by the top management, communications are made to counsel by subordinate corporate
agents and employees.
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1224, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted).
8. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to endorse or reject the control group test in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), a7'dmem. by an equally
divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (Douglas, J., abstaining). Also, the first draft of Rule 503 of the
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 249 (1969)
proposed to Congress adopted a control group approach. Congress, however, deleted control
group language, in part because of the 4-4 split in the Supreme Court on the issue. See Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 606 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977); Kobak, The Uneven Application of
the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339 363-64
(1972); Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients. The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 424, 434-35 (1970).
9. Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competency, Privi-
leges, Witnesses, Opinion, andExpert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L.J. 227, 287 (1978). At least one state
(Oklahoma) has adopted the control group test as part of its rules of evidence. OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 2502 (1978).
10. For a general overview of the corporate attorney-client problem see Simon, The Attorney.
Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956). Some of the alternative tests
are described in Comment, The Privileged Few: The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corpo-
rations, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 288, 297-310 (1972).
11. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), ajf'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
12. After identifying United Shoe and all its subsidiaries and affiliates as "the client," the
court then refused to allow the privilege because "[n]one of these corporations or their officers or
employees consulted counsel with the purpose of seeking assistance .. " 89 F. Supp. at 359
(emphasis added).
13. "The employees in question were concerned with managerial and policy determinations
but Judge Wyzanski's opinion did not indicate that this was a factor in his decision." 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE I 503(b)[04] (1979).
14. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In dictum, the Supreme Court stated that, "the protective cloak of
[the attorney-client] privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a
witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." Id. at 508. For a discussion of the
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the viability of United Shoe's broad standard.'5
A federal district court in Pennsylvania restricted the scope of the
privilege in City ofPhilade#phia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 16 In for-
mulating the control group test, this court allowed the privilege to be
invoked only by employees who control corporate decision making and
communicate to the corporate attorney information pertaining to a le-
gal matter about which the corporation is seeking advice.'7 The privi-
lege was expressly limited to those "in a position to control or even to
take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corpo-
ration may take upon the advice of the attorney. .. , [because] in ef-
fect, . . . he is (or personifies) the corporation . . ." 18 The focus of
this test is on the person who communicates with the attorney rather
than on the substance of his communication. Courts adopting this ap-
proach generally have limited its protection to upper-level management
personnel.' 9
One advantage of this test is that the number of employees who
can communicate privileged information is easily determined.20 The
possible conflict between United Shoe and Hickman see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)104] (1979).
15. In formulating a test [the court in United Shoe] stated in part that the privilege was
applicable to "information which was secured from an officer or employee of defendant
and which was not disclosed in a public document or before a third person ...."
These words taken alone would appear to extend the privilege of communication to eve-
ryone within the corporation. However, in another part of the opinion Judge Wyzanski
refers to Hickman v. Taylor as authority for the proposition that "there is no privilee for
so much of a lawyer's letter, report or opinion as relates to a fact gleaned from a witness
.... " The result of this statement is to create uncertainty as to the scope of the United
Shoe test. The Hickman case was not only concerned with the application of the work-
product doctrine, but also with the possible application of the attorney-client privilege.
There is some authority to the effect that the reference to Hickman in United Shoe lim-
ited the scope of the test. Others, however, either ignore this reference or think it of little
significance and interpret United Shoe as setting down a broad standard.
Case Comment, Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege-Who Can Represent a Corporation in Com-
munications to Counsel, City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), 44 BOSTON U.L. REv. 123, 125-27 (1964) (citation omitted).
16. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
17. Id. at 485. The plaintiff in this case sought an order directing the defendant corporation
to answer certain interrogatories. The defendant's counsel had obtained the requested informa-
tion from company employees and refused to answer, claiming an attorney-client privilege. The
court refused to allow the privilege to be invoked for these particular communications. Id.
18. Id.
19. See United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979) (implying that only certain
senior corporate officers are likely to be members of the control group); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d
686 (10th Cir. 1968); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963). See
generally Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients: The Control-Group Test, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 424 (1970); Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the
Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759 (1971).
20. The control group test is supported by its ease of application. While the truth of that
statement cannot be doubted, one must still question whether such an advantage should
4
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test is both expedient and easy to apply.2' The test has been criticized,
however, because it may result in undue harshness to corporations in-
volved in complicated litigation.22 It is based on the premise that a
control group member is aware of the details of all facets of the corpo-
rate entity. The realities of corporate structure, however, cast doubts
on the feasibility of a theory which assumes a control group member
be the primary goal of the attorney-client privilege, especially as the privilege applies to
the corporation. Merely because a particular test gives the courts a bright-line rule for
differentiating those who are and those who are not included within the attorney-client
privilege is hardly a convincing reason to make it the universal doctrine. The purpose of
the privilege is to encourage uninhibited discussion between attorney and client, and the
corporate "person" undoubtedly needs such discussion as much as the natural person.
Developing a rule suitable for the corporate arena may prove more challenging, but an
equitable application of the policies behind the privilege should not be sidestepped on
the grounds of expediency alone.
Note, The PrivilegedFew: The Attorney-Client Privilege as Appliedto Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 288, 300 (1972). See also Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Setting. A Suggested.Approach, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 360, 370 (1970).
21. Once a court identifies the members of the control group within a corporation, then com-
munications by these persons may be privileged. Regardless of the nature of the communication
between other employees and the corporate attorney, the privilege may not be invoked by the
corporation because the other employees do not speak as "the client."
22. Cases in this area frequently involve antitrust issues with large amounts of money at
stake. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afjdnem.
by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (Douglas, J., abstaining). See also In re Ampicil-
lin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978), where the court in rejecting the control test
as an artificial limit stated,
Because attorneys may have to communicate with a number of employees in a corpora-
tion in order to render proper advice, particularly when antitrust and patent issues are
involved, if those communications are never privileged, then the well-established pur-
pose of the privilege-to promote full and frank discussion-would be frustrated.
Id. at 387.
Citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974), which ad-
dressed the feasibility of using the control group test for corporate clients involved in antitrust and
patent issues, the Ampicillin court agreed that:
[A corporation] cannot deal solely through the chairman of the board of directors. There
has to be a sufficient number of persons within a corporation who are authorized on
behalf of the corporation to seek advice, to give information with respect to the rendition
of advice, and to receive advice.
. . . This is an antitrust case. If the chairman of the board and the president of a
corporation were to seek advice on antitrust law, the only way that a lawyer can really
understand how a corporation operates, what it is doing, and what it can do within the
confines of the antitrust laws, is to go out into the branch offices and into the field to
make the rounds with the salesmen. . . . If an attorney cannot make enquiries of sales-
men and if the attorney cannot give advice to the corporate personnel who will apply it,
then a corporation would be reluctant to seek legal advice since its confidential commu-
nications would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege. . . . Unless corporate
personnel on a fairly low level can speak to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of
the federal antitrust laws is likely to be adversely affected.
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 386-87 (D.D.C. 1978) (citations omitted),
quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1974). The
court then concluded that "the main consideration is whether the particular representative of the
client, to whom or from whom the communication is made, is involved in rendering information
necessary to the decision-making process concerning a problem on which legal advice is sought."
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at 387.
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has enough information to effectively aid the attorney in his duties. In
a complex corporate structure it is unreasonable to assume that upper
management can provide all the information the attorney requires.
Decision making responsibilities are often delegated to numerous mid-
dle-level managers who should be able to provide the necessary infor-
mation, but whose communications would not be protected by the
corporation's attorney-client privilege under this test.23
An attraction of the narrowness of the control group doctrine is
that it supports the current judicial trend of allowing broad discovery.24
The test is consistent with the prevailing policy of removing nearly all
obstacles in the path of an attorney involved in discovery. This broad
discovery policy, however, must be balanced against the underlying
principle of the attorney-client privilege, encouraging a client to confi-
dentially disclose all pertinent information to his attorney.25
In its effort to balance the need for disclosure of relevant informa-
23. The sole basis for application of the privilege is the status of the communicating person
within the decision making structure of the corporation. But in an antitrust case, such as Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afJ'd mem. by an equally divided
Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (Douglas, J., abstaining), where the business actions and decisions of
numerous middle management were involved in the wrongdoing, it is essential that the nature of
their potential testimony be available to the attorney. Although these individuals may have been
the ones most responsible for corporate liability, and "though their information could be the foun-
dation for sound legal decision-making," these communications to counsel would not be privi-
leged under the control group test. Comment, The Privileged Few: The Attorney-Client Privilege as
Applied to Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 288, 302-03 (1972).
24. The Supreme Court espoused this trend in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1942), stat-
ing:
[Tihe deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, ei-
ther party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The
deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility
of surprise.
Id. at 507 (footnote omitted). See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 81 (3d ed. 1976).
25. For a discussion of the purposes of the attorney-client privilege see Gardner, 4 Re-evalua-
tion 0/the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. 1-2), 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 447 (1963). The problem of
balancing these purposes against discovery policies is the central issue in determining the scope of
the privilege. One court summarized the issue:
While the privilege serves a very important purpose, the Court is aware of the fact
that it may nevertheless be an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. Therefore, the
privilege ought to be "strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle." The Court, therefore, views its duty as that of achieving a
balance between the need for disclosure of all relevant information and the need to en-
courage free and open discussion by clients in the course of legal representation.
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1978) (citations omitted). If the
balance is upset and the number of persons within a corporation who can represent it is too seri-
ously limited, the corporation will be encouraged to remain silent. See Recent Case, Corpora-
6
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tion against the need for open discussion between clients and their at-
torneys, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected
the control group test in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.26
This court provided an alternative test for determining those employees
who may speak under the protection of the privilege by focusing on the
substance, or "subject matter," of the communication:
[A]n employee of the corporation, though not a member of its
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so
that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privi-
leged where the employee makes the communication at the
direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the
subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by
the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the
performance by the employee of the duties of his employ-
ment.27
Those who prefer the Harper & Row test claim that this emphasis
on the subject matter of the legal representation is a more reasoned
approach to the problem than the artificial limitations provided in the
control group test.28 The major criticism of the Harper & Row standard
has been that it encourages corporations to thwart otherwise legitimate
discovery by channeling communications through the corporate attor-
ney even if those communications are unrelated to the underlying pur-
pose of the privilege.29 By failing to relate the scope of the attorney-
client privilege to its major function, encouraging uninhibited attorney-
client communications, Harper & Row effectively exempts from discov-
ery all information except that which an employee might obtain fortui-
tously °3 0 The subject matter test has been criticized by proponents of
lions-Attorney- Client Privilege-Corporate Employee's Communication to Attorney at Direction of
Corporation Held to be Privileged, 23 VAND. L. REV. 847, 852 n.30 (1970).
26. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afdmem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)
(Douglas, J., abstaining). See generally, Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-The Attor-
ney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting. A SuggestedApproach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360 (1970);
Recent Case, Corporations-Attorney-Client Privilege-Corporate Employee's Comnunication to
Attorney at Direction of Corporation Held to be Privileged, 23 VAND. L. REv. 847 (1970).
27. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
28. For articles critical of the control group test see generally Burnham, Con fidentialio andthe
Corporate Lawyer. The Attorney-Client Privilege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542
(1968); Dye, The Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 15 PRAc. LAW. 15 (1969); Heininger, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. B.J. 376 (1965); Maurer, Privileged
Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352 (1967).
29. See Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the Corpo-
rate Area, 22 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 759, 766-67 (1971). See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[041 (1979).
30. Critics argue justifiably that the Harper & Row test may be used to shield too much data
from the discovery process. See, e.g., Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control
[Vol. 15:390
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liberal discovery,3 1 and is considered by many to be overbroad and sus-
ceptible to abuse. 2
One recent attempt to construct a functional test for applying the
privilege to the corporate context was the formation of a modified sub-
ject matter test in Divers/fled Industries, Inc. v. Meredith. 3 The Eighth
Circuit added anti-abuse safeguards in its compromise version of the
corporate attorney-client privilege test:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's
communication if (1) the communication was made for the
purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the
communication did so at the direction of his corporate supe-
rior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation
could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the com-
munication is within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond
those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to
know its contents. We note, moreover, that the corporation
has the burden of showing that the communication in issue
meets all of the above requirements.34
In stressing the relevance of the communication to the securing of legal
advice and to the superior's motives in requesting such advice, the Di-
versfed test more nearly meshes with the scope of the underlying pur-
pose of the privilege than does the Harper & Row test.3 5  Diversfed
encourages full disclosure by an employee to the corporation's attorney
Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759 (1971). See also Note, Attorney-
Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970).
31. See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.61[31 (2d ed. 1976).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (1979).
It is our opinion that the "subject matter" approach goes too far .... The "subject
matter" test encourages senior managers purposely to ignore important information they
have good business reasons to know and use. Corporate counsel should not be the exclu-
sive repository of unpleasant facts. The law should not encourage corporate managers to
shield themselves from information about possibly illegal transactions.
Id See also Recent Case, Privileged Communications-Who Can Speakfor a Corporate Client, 44
Mo. L. REV. 350, 357-58 (1979).
33. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978). For discussions of this case see Note, The Corporate Attor-
ney- Client Privilege-A Compromise Solution: Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 11 CONN.
L. REv. 94 (1978); Note, Corporate4ttorney-Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Mere-
dith- The Modijed Harper & Row Test, 4 J. CORP. L. 226 (1978); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege-
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith: New Rules/or Applying the Privilege When the Client is a
Corporation, 57 N.C.L. REv. 306 (1979); Recent Case, Privileged Communications-Who Can
Speakfor a Corporate Client, 44 Mo. L. REV. 350, 357-58 (1979).
34. 572 F.2d at 609. In arriving at this compromise solution, the Diversifled court followed
the suggested Harper & Row modifications made by Judge Jack B. Weinstein in his treatise on
evidence. Id. citing 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 503(b)[04] (1979).
35. It has been said that the new test "curbs whatever potential for abuse the Harper & Row
test presents while maintaining the purpose of the privilege to a greater degree than allowed under
1979]
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in matters relating to the duties of his employment. Further, in provid-
ing limits to the subject matter of the disclosure, it is consistent with the
current trend allowing broad discovery.36 The test, however, has not
yet been adopted by other courts and both the Sixth and Third Circuits
rejected it in recent holdings. 7
III. UNITED STATES V UPJOHN CO.
In Upjohn the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the
question, "whether this Circuit should adopt the 'control group' or the
broader 'subject matter' test as the standard for measuring the scope of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context."3" The factual
situation presented to this court involved a corporation which had au-
thorized its counsel to conduct an investigation of possible improper
activities. The corporation later sought to prevent disclosure of this in-
formation by claiming an attorney-client privilege.3 9
In a 1971 audit of Upjohn's federal income tax returns the IRS
discovered that approximately $4,400,000 had been paid to officials in
foreign countries where Upjohn conducted business. Concerned that
these payments might not have been properly reported to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the top management of Upjohn ordered an
internal investigation. Both in-house and outside counsel were in-
volved in the inquiry, and company officers and employees were urged
to respond to all questions candidly and confidentially. 0
The IRS subsequently sought to obtain the documents and records
generated in the course of this investigation and summoned all written
questionnaires, counsel's notes, and memoranda claiming they were
necessary for an adequate evaluation of the tax implications of the pay-
ments in question.4' The district court decided to enforce the summons
the control group test." Note, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith-The Modt.'ed Harper & Row Test, 4 J. CORP. L. 226, 237 (1978).
36. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
37. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979).
38. 600 F.2d 1223, 1224 (6th Cir. 1979).
39. Upjohn claimed that communications made by all officers and agents were made on be-
half of the company, and were, therefore, made by the "client." Id. at 1225.
40. Id.
41. Id. After the internal investigation, voluntary disclosures of some of the details of the
payments were made to the SEC and the IRS. The IRS then commenced the investigation in-
volved but thought the limited disclosure was inadequate for its purposes. Id.
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and ordered Upjohn to turn the materials over to the IRS. 42 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed part of the decision, reversed
part, and remanded the case to the district court for further considera-
tion.43 This circuit adopted the control group test for determining the
scope of the attorney-client privilege, and held that in applying this test
only communications by members of the control group could be privi-
leged and exempt from enforcement of the IRS summons.44
Upjohn argued that the communications to counsel made by all
employees during the course of the investigation were privileged as
confidential communications between attorney and client.45 In arguing
for protection of all communications, Upjohn was asking the court to
adopt a broader standard than the control group test. The court re-
jected the subject matter approach 46 deciding that a narrower approach
should be the Sixth Circuit's stance on the question.47 The court held
that "[t]o the extent that the communications were made by, officers
and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in response to
legal advice . . . the communications were not the 'client's.' "48 The
case was remanded for the purpose of determining which communica-
tions were made by members of the control group of the corporation
and should, therefore, be privileged.49
The court rejected Upjohn's plea for a broad test, fearing such a
test would create a "broad 'zone of silence' " by encouraging lower ech-
elon employees to communicate all types of information to corporate
counsel.5 An abuse of the privilege in this manner could shield a cor-
42. The district court's order enforcing the summons for documents was based on the juris-
dictional authority provided in 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a) (1976).
43. 600 F.2d at 1225.
44. After determining that the control group test would be used, the court noted:
The record indicates that, in the course of their investigation, Upjohn's counsel inter-
viewed a number of senior corporate officers, including the Chairman of the Board, the
Vice Chairman, and the President. These senior officers, and possibly others, are in all
likelihood members of the "control group" and their communications to counsel should
be privileged. Therefore, we remand the case to the District Court to determine which
communications sought by the IRS were made by members of the "control group" and
to deny enforcement of the summons with respect to these "control group" communica-
tions.
Id. at 1227-28 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 1225.
46. For a discussion of the subject matter approach, see notes 26-36 supra and accompanying
text.
47. 600 F.2d at 1227.
48. Id. at 1225.
49. Id. at 1227-28. See note 44 supra.
50. 600 F.2d at 1227. The fear is that "communications-many of which may be trivial in
themselves-[will be] entitled to protection against disclosure .. " J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
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porate client from disclosing information which otherwise should not
be privileged. This zone of silence criticism was, however, satisfactorily
answered in the compromise Diversifed test.-' Diversfled determined
that the communication must be made for the purpose of securing legal
advice and must be requested by a superior seeking legal advice, 52 thus
preventing the routing of routine reports and memoranda to the attor-
ney solely to claim a privilege. The Sixth Circuit, however, summarily
dismissed the Diversfled safeguards and classified that standard as
merely a version of the disfavored subject matter test 5 3 The court con-
tinued its criticism of the subject matter test by saying:
This [test], in turn, fosters situations in which the only record
of the full details of a particular transaction is in the hands of
corporate counsel and, under the "subject matter" test, undis-
coverable. Discovery, then, would have to be directed at the
corporate agents who know the details of the transaction
rather than at the corporation's management.5 4
A policy or doctrine which forces the adversary to aim his discovery
procedures toward the most knowledgeable party, however, should not
automatically be categorized as undesirable. If, for instance, discovery
questions were designed to elicit information about certain accounting
procedures, it would be sensible to interrogate the employee who has
the specific knowledge requested rather than obtaining second-hand in-
formation from a corporate director, officer, or attorney.
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04] (1979). See also Simon, The Atorney-Client Privilege asAp.
plied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956), where the phrase "zone of silence" was apparently
coined.
Where corporations are involved, with their large number of agents, masses of docu-
ments, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large. Few
judges-or legislators either, for that matter-would long tolerate any common law priv-
ilege that allowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them with
legal advisors. It is this risk, and this challenge, that underlie a number of attorney-client
privilege problems peculiar to corporations.
Id. at 955-56.
51. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). The Diversfed court, in its modification of the Harper &
Row test, stated that
the mere receipt of routine reports by the corporation's counsel will not make the com-
munication privileged, either because the communication will have been made available
to those who do not need to know or because the communication was not made for the
purpose of securing legal advice. Moreover, application of the attorney-client privilege
will do little to further encourage this type of communication since they will continue to
be made for independent business reasons.
Id. at 609.
52. Id See Attorney-Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith: New Rulesfor
Applying the Privilege When the Client is a Corporation, 57 N.C.L. REV. 306, 317 (1979).
53. 600 F.2d at 1226, nn.5 & 6.
54. Id. at 1227 (emphasis in original).
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The Upjohn court ignored the benefits and safeguards of the Diver-
s/fed solution. Its decision to adopt the control group test failed to
address the major criticisms other courts have recognized as valid. For
example, a control group generally does not include middle manage-
ment whose decisions are often perfunctorily ratified by upper manage-
ment and officers." This reality of corporate life was ignored in
Upjohn. To be protected by the attorney-client privilege in a control
group jurisdiction each corporation must bear the burden of passing
such information from lower-level employees through the control
group members to the attorney. Otherwise, disclosures made by mid-
dle management will not be protected under this test.
Further, in attempting to evaluate the various tests, the Upjohn
court failed to analyze adequately the factual situation confronting it. 6
The specific materials summoned in Upjohn were obtained by counsel
after the informants were told that any communications would be con-
fidential.57 Had the employees and the attorneys been able to foresee
the future exposure of these confidences, the employees probably
would have been reluctant to disclose complete details of the transac-
tions involving the questionable payments. The attorneys would have
been deprived of information needed to aid the corporation in deter-
mining its legal status with the SEC. 8 The fundamental purpose of the
attorney-client privilege would have been undermined.
Justice would have been better served in Upjohn if the court had
examined more carefully the ramifications of adopting the control
group test. Had the court closely inspected the effects of the control
group test, it should have noticed the often criticized flaws in this doc-
trine,59 and should have adopted a more reasonable test for determin-
55. See Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (identifying the
control group as the corporation's officers, directors, and department heads). See generally Ko-
bak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney- Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts,
6 GA. L. REv. 339 (1972); Maurer, Privileged Communications andthe Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA.
LAW. 352, 375 (1967); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALEL.J. 953 (1956); Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84
HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970).
56. The court briefly mentioned the strengths of the control group test and the weaknesses of
the subject matter test without applying either test to the Upjohn facts. The more recent Diversi-
fied test was dismissed without analysis.
57. 600 F.2d at 1225.
58. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege
and "Work Product"in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542 (1968); Heininger, The Attorney Client Privilege as
It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. B.J. 376 (1965); Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 15 PRAc. LAW. 15 (1969); Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients: The Control
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ing the scope of the attorney-client privilege as it relates to
corporations. It is apparent that the Sixth Circuit sacrificed an in-depth
examination of the available tests in the interests of expediency. The
court claimed that the control group test guards against undue limita-
tion of evidence while still promoting free and confidential communi-
cation between decision makers and counsel.6" It ignored the fact that
the evidence sought by the IRS was elicited under the guise of an attor-
ney-client relationship between the corporation and the lawyers in-
volved." The court effectively undermined this relationship, thus
encouraging Upjohn and other Sixth Circuit corporations to abuse the
attorney-client privilege.
IV. ZN RE GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also recently adopted
the control group test stating that, "we find no persuasive reason to
deviate from the approach taken by the majority of the federal
courts. . . .[T]he control-group test is both broad enough and flexible
enough to accommodate the needs of a corporate client."' 62 As in
Upjohn, the factual situation involved a corporation's (Sun Company,
Inc.) internal investigation of questionable payments made to foreign
officials.6" The corporation was then subpoenaed to produce docu-
ments resulting from the investigation. These documents included in-
terview memoranda and questionnaires. Sun asserted that the
documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege64 and
Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424 (1970); Note, Privileged Communications-Lnroads on the "Con-
trol Group" Test inthe Corporate Area, 22 SYPACUSE L. REv. 759 (1971).
60. 600 F.2d at 1227. There is no doubt that the test guards against possible restraints on
discovery of evidence, but by limiting confidential communications to a few top level decision
makers the control group standard does not promote much free or open discussion.
61. "The company had directed its in-house counsel, along with outside counsel, to conduct
an internal investigation of these payments. At the request of Upjohn's top management, officers
and employees of the company were urged to respond to counsel's questions candidly and col/-
dentially." Id. at 1225 (emphasis added).
62. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979).
63. Sun initially requested its audit committee to conduct an investigation. The committee
reported that no significant violations had occurred, but new information led the Board of Direc-
tors to retain outside counsel and reopen the investigation. The outside counsel apparently as-
sisted and advised the audit committee in the second investigation, but the final report made to
Sun's Board of Directors was prepared by the committee itself. Id.
64. Sun's alternative assertion was that the documents were also protected under the work-
product doctrine. The court did not address the attorney-client privilege issue until it had decided
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could not be reached by a grand jury subpoena.65
Before choosing the control group test, the court studied the alter-
natives adopted by other circuits.6 6 A brief examination was made of
the underlying policies of the privilege,67 and the various tests were
reviewed. 68  Beginning with the premise that the control group test, as
adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, offers at least a bare minimum
of protection for the corporate client 69 the court first examined this test
carefully.
The court addressed criticisms of the control group test, but found
no convincing arguments that this majority approach should not also
be adopted by the Third Circuit.70 The court observed 7' that one criti-
65. Sun filed a report with the SEC which disclosed that questionable payments had been
made and which, in turn, prompted an investigation by the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The United States Attorney requested a large number of documents
including,'all interview memoranda, questionnaires, statements, or other recorded recollections of
these events. ... Id. at 1227-28. When Sun refused to release a portion of these documents a
grand jury subpoena was issued.
66. Confronted with such an array of possibilities, we feel compelled to examine certain
basic principles. First, as all courts and commentators seem to agree, the attorney-client
privilege exists to foster disclosure and communication between the attorney and the
client. Nevertheless, because the privilege obstructs the search for the truth and because
its benefits are, at best, "indirect and speculative," it must be "strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." Moreover, although
the need for a rule of predictable application has been questioned, especially in the cor-
porate context, we agree with the majority view that the incentive to confide is at least
partially dependent upon the client's ability to predict that the communication will be
held in confidence.
Id. at 1235 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 1233-35.
68. Id.
69. The court stated that,
it is socially desirable to protect, at a minimum, communications made by a person who
has the authority to take part in a decision about any action to be taken in response to
the solicited advice. Whether the privilege should be enlarged beyond that point should
depend upon whether a broader rule would serve the policy of full communication un-
derlying the privilege itself.
Id at 1235 (footnote omitted).
70. Beginning with the statement that the control group test "adopted by a majority of the
federal courts, draws as bright a line as any of the proposed approaches," id. at 1235, the court
reasoned through an analysis of the test and summarized, "[W]e find no persuasive reason to
deviate from the approach taken by the majority of the federal courts." Id at 1237.
71. Id. at 1236. This observation apparently stemmed from the Diversified court's statement:
The principal criticism is that the control group test attempts to equate corporate clients
with individual clients. An individual client both communicates to a lawyer and, based
on the lawyer's advice, decides on an appropriate course of action. Similarly, before an
employee's communication will be deemed the corporate client's communication, the
control group test demands that the employee communicate to the attorney and be in a
position to control or play a substantial role in any decision based on the attorney's
advice. In practice, this results in protecting only communications of top level executives
which fails to take into account the realities of corporate life.
572 F.2d at 608.
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cism centers around the principle that a corporate client differs from an
individual client in that corporate employees who know relevant facts
frequently are not the decision makers, whereas an individual client
assumes both roles.72 The court acknowledged that an attorney who
wants to advise soundly the decision makers must seek information
from other employees.7 3 But the court would not concede that confi-
dentiality would aid in securing such information.74 The court noted
that any confidentiality extended to employees outside the control
group would be illusory because such employees would have no control
over the privilege; their communications would remain confidential
only so long as the control group were to assert the privilege. The cor-
poration would have the power to release any such communications by
merely waiving the privilege.75 Reasoning from this basis, the court
refused to accept the notion that extending the privilege beyond control
group communications would further an attorney's information gather-
ing from those outside the control group:
Privilege or no privilege, lower-level employees would confide
in corporate counsel at their own risk. Conversely, where no
questionable activity is involved, non-control-group employ-
ees have little reason not to relate information to corporate
counsel, especially where a superior has instructed them to do
so. In short, we do not believe that extension of the corpora-
tion's privilege against disclosure would significantly add to
an attorney's ability to obtain information from employees
outside the control-group.76
72. See Burnham, Confdentiali y and the Corporate Lawyer: The AttorneyClient Privilege
and "Work Product"in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 546-47 (1968). See also Note Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege-Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith-The Modfed Harper & Row Test, 4 J.
CORP. L. 226, 229 (1978).
73. 599 F.2d at 1236.
74. Id.
75. One author has answered this argument:
Like the barrier of caste, which it closely resembles, the rigidity of the control group
test is neither salutary nor necessary. It would better serve the interests of society to
encourage a desire for legal advice at whatever level that desire exists within a corpora-
tion. An employee who lacks power may not be wanting in zeal. If such an earnest soul
perceives a problem while acting within the scope of his employment and subsequently
secures legal advice, the communication ought to be privileged, even ([the outcome is
determined by those to whom he reports. The potential for social benefit inherent in the
communication does not vary drastically with the status of its narrator.
Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 368 (1972) (emphasis added).
76. 599 F.2d at 1236. The court's simplistic analysis here betrays its failure to examine fully
the issue. Dean McCormick has recognized the errancy of this type analysis.
Perhaps we need not yield fully to the force of Bentham's slashing argument that the
privilege is not needed by the innocent party with a righteous cause or defense, and that
[Vol. 15:390
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What the court failed to recognize, however, was that by focusing
on the person communicating with the attorney, the control group test
forces corporations seeking the advice of counsel and wishing to retain
the privilege to channel all confidences through members of the control
group. This is an unreasonable, artificial limit to place on confidential
communications. As stated earlier 7 this test ignores the realities of
corporate life and unnecessarily burdens corporations.
The court next directed its attention to the possibility that under
the control group test an attorney dealing with a complex legal problem
would be faced with a "Hobson's choice":7 8 interviews with control
group members would not produce adequate information, 9 but inter-
views with employees outside the control group would not be privi-
leged.8" In answering this argument the appellate judges reasoned that
the work product doctrine, as stated in Hickman v. Taylor,8 would pro-
tect inquiries made in anticipation of litigation. The court further rea-
soned that where "there is no prospect of litigation, corporate counsel
has little reason to be apprehensive about the unprivileged nature of
the investigation."82 Hickman v. Taylor, however, does not offer abso-
lute protection as, under its doctrine, immunity from disclosure hinges
on the need for discovery and the nature of the documents sought.8 3
The dilemma remains for an in-house attorney seeking other types of
the guilty should not be given its aid in concerting a false one. Wigmore in answer
points out that in lawsuits all is not black and white but a client's case may be one where
there is no real preponderance of morals and justice on either side, and he may mistak-
enly think a fact fatal to his cause, when it is not, and thus be impelled, if there were no
privilege, to forego resort to counsel for advice in a fair claim.
McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972), at 176 (cita-
tions omitted).
77. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
78. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the,4ttorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1971).
79. Especially in problems such as antitrust litigation, it is unlikely that persons "having the
very highest authority" will have enough facts to convey what actually transpired to the attorney.
Id.
80. No matter how essential this information might be to aid the attorney in his fact-finding
process or legal advice, the communications will not be protected by the privilege.
81. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
82. 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979).
83. "[Dlocuments subject to the work product rule are discoverable for good cause; if they
are subject to the attorney-client privilege they are absolutely barred." 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04] (1979). A discussion of the many problems in-
volved in analyzing the work product doctrine is beyond the scope of this note. For a general
discussion of the interrelationship between the work product and the attorney-client privilege, see
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 958-66 (1956);
Case Comment, Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege-Who Can Represent a Corporation in Com-
munication to Counsel, City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), 44 BOSTON U.L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1964).
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information from corporate employees. 84
The court also recognized that a control group test might discour-
age some corporations from conducting internal investigations.8 - The
court dismissed this argument by stating simply that attorneys "have
little choice"86 other than to conduct introspective investigations when
necessary. "In our opinion, the potential costs of undetected noncom-
pliance [with complex laws] are themselves high enough to ensure that
corporate officials will authorize investigations regardless of an inabil-
ity to keep such investigations completely confidential."8 " While con-
ceding that "[a] broader test undoubtedly would encourage the
employment of outside counsel to conduct internal corporate investiga-
tions," 8 the court concluded that a "narrower control-group test will
[not] significantly reduce" such employment.89 Again referring to pro-
tections offered by the work product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, the
court assured itself that adequate safeguards already exist for attorneys
seeking confidential information and that a broadening of any protec-
tive privilege is unnecessary.90
Satisfying itself that the criticisms of the control group standard
were not sufficiently persuasive to cause the court to deviate from the
majority viewpoint, this appellate court adopted that test. By aligning
itself with proponents of the arbitrary control group test, the court
failed to develop an alternate, perhaps more rational, interpretation of
the privilege. Avoiding the risk of adopting a more imaginative
method for protecting privileged communications from corporate cli-
ents to attorneys, this court superficially analyzed the issue, concluding
that the majority test should not be challenged. As a result, corporate
clients in the Third Circuit may now join corporations in other control
group jurisdictions in channeling all communications of a confidential
nature through members of the designated control group.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate in the federal courts over the ideal scope of the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege is rapidly becoming one-sided. The
84. 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979).
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id, citing Note, Attorney-Client Privilege/or Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test,
84 HARV. L. REv. 424, 431-32 (1970).
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Ufpjohn and Grand Jury Investigation decisions have tilted the weight
of authority toward acceptance of a control group theory. This insis-
tence by some courts on adopting artificial but convenient limits on the
scope of the privilege may thwart recent attempts to provide a proper
balance between the client's need for confidentiality and the law's need
for discovery of relevant evidence. The search for a reasonable ap-
proach may have been weakened by these decisions. Perhaps when the
issue again reaches the Supreme Court, as it surely will,9' that body
will realize the practical and philosophical defects in the control group
test and adopt a rule which more nearly meets the needs of a corporate
client seeking legal advice.
Nancy L Woods
91. The Supreme Court has indeed granted certiorari in Upjohn. 48 U.S.L.W. 3602 (U.S.
Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886).
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